A RESPONSE TO SCHILL AND WACHTER'S
THE SPATIAL BIAS OF FEDERAL
HOUSING LAW AND POLICY
GEORGE GALSTERt
In their article, The SpatialBias of FederalHousingLaw and Policy:
ConcentratedPoverty in Urban America,1 Professors Michael Schill and
Susan Wachter provide a careful, scholarly critique of palpable
policy relevance. Their analysis reflects the consistent pattern that
their past productive collaboration has established: a thoughtful
amalgam of legal, historical, economic, and statistical expertise that
yields provocative conclusions. It is thus my privilege to have the
opportunity to comment upon it.
The fundamental claim of Schill and Wachter's article is that
past and current federal housing law and policy (especially as they
relate to public housing and mortgage markets) intensify the
concentration of low-income families in inner-city neighborhoods,
either intentionally or unintentionally.2 Fortunately, they argue,
many of these mistakes are capable of remediation through new
federal initiatives.
Much of the historical evidence Schill and Wachter offer to
support their claim is compelling. Although this is familiar territory
to scholars, as Schill and Wachter's footnotes show, the authors
present the material succinctly and powerfully. To their credit, they
bring to bear econometric methods to supplement the historical
analysis, and find evidence related to the geography of public
housing and the rejection patterns of mortgage lenders that they
claim buttress their case.
My response to Schill and Wachter's analysis essentially is that
important aspects of their argument are either conceptually and/or
empirically inconclusive. Furthermore, their discussion of "current"
federal housing policy pays insufficient attention to recent initiatives
of the Clinton Administration that go a long way in the directions
advocated by the authors. I will first consider Schill and Wachter's
arguments that relate to public housing, then those that relate to
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the Community Reinvestment Act.
implications.

Finally, I will discuss policy

I. PUBLIC HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOOD EXTERNALITIES

Schill and Wachter note several plausible means by which past
public-housing siting, tenant, and maintenance policies could have
intensified the concentration of poor families in central cities. One
set of reasons is almost tautological: given that high-density publichousing complexes were built in neighborhoods that already had
above-average poverty concentrations and were inhabited predominantly by poor families, observed rates of poverty must be higher in
such neighborhoods.' The other set of reasons is behavioral and
involves unsubsidized households. At root, Schill and Wachter
argue that concentrations of public housing create a variety of
negative externalities for the surrounding environs. Such externalities might reasonably be expected to induce nonpoverty families to
move from the area and deter others from moving in, depress
property values, and encourage property owners to defer maintenance and to subdivide dwellings into smaller rental units. All this
should lead to an increase in the proportion of poor families
residing in the private housing stock near public housing.'
To test this proposition, Schill and Wachter specify and estimate
a logit model for post-World War II Philadelphia census tracts.
They find that, ceteris paribus, tracts with a larger share of public
housing in their neighborhood dwelling stock at the beginning of a
decade have a significantly higher ratio of poor to nonpoor families
by the end of that decade. They correctly note that this statistical
result is consistent with their hypothesis of neighborhood externalities.'
My response would be twofold. First, the externality interpretation is inconsistent with the body of evidence (cited by Schill and
Wachter) that fails to find lower property values near public-housing
projects. Second, there are two alternative (not mutually exclusive)
explanations for the Schill-Wachter statistical result that do not
involve externalities and are consistent with the aforementioned
property value studies: increasing concentrations of poverty within
' Unless, of course, the number of poor families displaced in order to construct
the public housing exceeded those eventually housed in such housing.
' See Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1300-08.
5 See id. at 1301-07.
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public-housing projects themselves and massive abandonment of the
private housing stock that was unrelated to public housing.
The first scenario was alluded to by Schill and Wachter: during
the post-war period, public-housing occupancy rules increasingly
targeted the poorest of the poor and rendered working families
ineligible.6 Thus, even with no impact on the private stock nearby,
the presence of public housing could prove statistically associated
with rising ratios of poor to nonpoor families. Some hypothetical
data to illustrate this claim are presented in Scenario 1 in Table I.
It compares two neighborhoods, A and B, that are identical in every
respect (including beginning of period poverty/nonpoverty ratios)
except the share of the stock comprised of public housing. Here,
if the poverty tenancy in the four hypothetical public-housing units
were to rise from two to four over the decade, the neighborhood
poverty/nonpoverty ratio would rise from .67 to 1.5, even with no
change in private stock there.
The second explanation is traced to the massive population and
housing stock losses associated with a bevy of region- and metropolitan-wide forces relating to transportation, technology, and industrial
restructuring.' Indeed, the City of Philadelphia's occupied housing
stock declined from a peak of 642,145 in 1970' to 603,075 in
1990,"° a loss of six percent. Such residential abandonment would
have displaced poor and nonpoor families from neighborhoods
where it occurred; ironically, because public housing was more
resistant to abandonment but was disproportionately occupied by
poor tenants, its presence in a neighborhood with private abandonment would yield a larger statistical increase in poverty/nonpoverty
ratios, even if there were no causal link. This process is illustrated
with Scenario 2 in Table ." Assume that privately owned units in
both neighborhoods A and B have both poor and nonpoor residents
at the beginning of the decade and that in both neighborhoods half
the private stock is abandoned (equally affecting both poor and
nonpoor, for simplicity).
Because the poor families in public
housing in neighborhood A remain constant, but the population of
See id. at 1294.
7See id. at 1287.
' See id. at 1311 n.104.
6
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nonpoor families has been reduced in A through abandonment, one
observes a higher poverty/nonpoverty ratio by the end of the
decade.
II. COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND
POVERTY CONCENTRATION

Schill and Wachter argue that federal mortgage lending
regulatory policies as embodied in the Community Reinvestment

Act (CRA) have unintended negative consequences for low-income
neighborhoods. To the extent that the CRA induces lenders to take
undue risks in accepting the applications for those seeking to buy
or improve properties in lower-income neighborhoods, it could
unwittingly foment the sort of concentrated defaults and neighborhood blight that characterized the Section 235 program of the
1970s.

12

Although the logic is attractive, the authors provide no evidence
that the CRA has had such an impact. Others have argued that
"CRA loans" are no riskier than standard loans. Rather, a variety of
biases, information shortcomings, and market failures have been
responsible for lenders' past shortcomings in these areas, problems
3
that can only be overcome through the impetus of the CRA.1
Indeed, the enhanced flow of funds may improve both efficiency
and equity, and may induce a variety of positive synergisms among
14
homeowners' expectations, mobility, and property reinvestment.
Even less persuasive is Schill and Wachter's claim that enforcement of the CRA intensifies the spatial concentration of poverty
because financial institutions may be encouraged to make loans to
marginally qualified (that is, poor) borrowers when they try to buy
homes in predominately poor neighborhoods.' 5 To test for this
"loan concentration effect," Schill and Wachter use 1991 Boston
data to estimate a model of mortgage application acceptances and
rejections. 6 They find that borrowers with income less than eighty
percent of metropolitan area median are more likely to be rejected
12

See id. at 1312-13.
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when they apply to purchase property in census tracts having
median incomes greater than eighty percent of the metropolitan
17
median, ceteris paribus.
I find the foregoing argument untenable for two overarching
reasons. First, if we accept for the moment that the CRA was
causing lenders to undertake unproductively risky activities vis-4-vis
low-income neighborhoods (as opposed to individuals), we should
observe that denial rates were lower for any applicants who were
attempting to purchase homes in lower-income neighborhoods,
ceteris paribus. Schill and Wachter's model provides such a test,18
and precisely the opposite result is evinced. Second, how can such
statistical results, no matter what patterns they demonstrate, be
convincingly traced to the CRA? Inasmuch as the Boston data
analyzed here were collected before the recently intensified
enforcement efforts by the federal financial institution regulatory
agencies and the Justice Department, they reveal as much about the
earlier inadequate enforcement of the CRA than its supposedly
potent (if perverse) effects. Indeed, when originally analyzed by
researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the data
employed by Schill and Wachter were used to demonstrate that
equally qualified minorities were denied for mortgage applications
at a rate sixty percent higher than whites. 9 Surely a testimony to
lax enforcement!
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Schill and Wachter make many recommendations for revising
federal policy with which I heartily agree. In contrast to their
specific and detailed recommendations for revising Section 8 and
public-housing regulations, however, their generalities about
needing to enhance civil rights enforcement stand in stark contrast.2" They are also conspicuously silent on the CRA. If it is as
bad as they suggest, how should it be modified?
Elsewhere I have analyzed what is needed for more effective civil
rights enforcement in housing and lending markets.2 Suffice it to
17 See id. at
18

1327-28.
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19 See id. at 1330.
20 See id. at 1329-33.
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note the bottom line: systemic, pattern and practice investigations
conducted with paired testers posing as home- or mortgage-seekers
are required.2 2 The difficulties of formulating and enforcing
effective CRA regulations are more troubling and well beyond the
23
scope of this Paper.
As a final point, I find Schill and Wachter's policy conclusions
unbalanced inasmuch as they do not pay sufficient attention to
numerous initiatives to deconcentrate poverty promulgated by the
Clinton Administration. In the area of fair housing enforcement,
HUD has increased the funding for the Fair Housing Initiatives
Program from $11 million in fiscal year 1993 to $26 million in fiscal
year 1995, and the Justice Department has significantly intensified
its fair housing and fair lending litigations.2 4 In the area of
expanding affordable housing opportunities, HUD has already
proposed several of the modifications suggested by Schill and
Wachter (increased portability, repeal of the nondiscrimination
clause, and pro-mobility counseling
through the Choice in Residence program) in the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1994 (which failed to pass in the 103d Congress). Finally, in the
area of public housing, HUD has resolved several longstanding
desegregation suits with the use of pro-mobility counseling and rent

vouchers. HUD has granted waivers permitting the mixing of
tenants and use of vouchers as "replacement units" for public
housing that has been demolished. If the HUD Reinvention
Blueprint becomes law, this trend of deconcentrating and revitalizing public housing will be intensified."

DiPasquale & Langley Keyes eds., 1990).
' Although this may have some limitations past the mortgage pre-application
stage. For more on the difficulties of bank examinations detecting disparate
treatment discrimination, see George Galster, Future Directions in Mortgage
Discrimination Research and Enforcement (paper presented at the HUD Home
Lending and Discrimination Conference, June 1993) (on file with author).
23 See George Galster, Evaluation of Proposed CRA Regulations: The Lending
Test (Urban Institute Report No. 6466, 1994) (on file with author).
24 See George Galster, Minority Poverty: The Place-Race Nexus and the Clinton
Administration'sCivil Rights Policy, in NEW CHALLENGES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD
OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION MID-TERM 31 (Corrine Yu & William Taylor eds.,
1994).
215Pro-mobility counseling is a service provided by housing authorities that assist
tenants in moving to neighborhoods that are less affected by poverty.
26 See U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Reinvention Blueprint (internal HUD
memorandum, Dec. 1994) (on file with author).
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CONCLUSION

Federal housing law and policy has undoubtedly contributed to
the concentration of poor families in our inner-city areas. But the
historical record of case documentation remains more convincing
than the record of statistical modeling, despite the laudable, pathbreaking investigations conducted by Schill and Wachter.
But such quibbles among scholars are merely a side show; it will
be much more intriguing to watch how Schill and Wachter's article
(and others in the same genre)2" will be used as ammunition in the
contemporary political process. Liberals may seize upon it as a
rationale for remedial federal intervention: "Take responsibility to
clean up the mess you made." Conservatives could utilize it to
justify diminishing the federal role in housing policy: "You messed
up before, how can you be trusted again?"
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